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allowed the insurer to defeat the insured's action for substantial
damages by settling even a small claim against the insured arising out
of the same cause of action. Thus the court held that the insured
could prevent the insurer from pleading the release as a defense.
The principal case-would seem to deny the insurer the right of
settlement and the right to control litigation-rights which were
given to it by the policy. However, since the insurer is chargeable
with knowledge that an insurer cannot bind its insured by making
settlement without his knowledge and consent,2" it should know that
the effect of the provisions in the contract would not give it those
rights.- If it wanted a final settlement of the claim against its in-
sured, the insurer would be forced to get the insured's permission.2
When compared to the alternatives,22 it would seem that the court
made the preferred choice.
CowLEs LIIPFERT
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-
Criminality of a Status
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The origin of
this provision of the Bill of Rights can be traced to the Magna
would be bound by the settlement. When he learned otherwise, the
releasor could repudiate the settlement by returning the consideration to the
insurer. To so hold would qualify the holding of Cochran and lend support
to the contention of the law review note where the releasor executed the
release for money consideration only. In such a case, ratification by the
insured should not release him, since the release was not part of the settle-
ment..
The concurring judge probably assumed that by making a settlement
with the releasor, the insured impliedly held itself out to be an agent of the
insured. But see Note, 38 N.C.L. REV. 81, 83 (1959), where it was sug-
gested that the releasor would be chargeable with knowledge that an insurer
cannot bind the insured without his consent and, therefore, could not be misled
by the insurer's making the settlement.
20 See Parham v. Robins, 197 Ga. 386, 29 S.E.2d 608 (1944).
" Unless a release is held to be conclusive evidence of the intent to settle
all claims of both parties arising from the same cause of action, the insurer
could also make a final settlement of the claim against the insured by first
notifying the releasor that it was not an agent of the insured. Of course
the insurer could still get authority from the insured to make such settle-
ment.
" Other alternatives would be to allow: (1) a release to bar only the
claims of the releasor; (2) an insurer to bind its insured by settling without
his knowledge and consent; (3) the insurer to plead the release without
it being considered a ratification by the insured.
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Carta' and the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.2- It was
adopted in 1791 as an admonition to all departments of the national
government against such violent proceedings as had taken place in
England during the reign of the Stuarts.' Most states have also
adopted constitutional provisions which in some form prohibit cruel
and unusual punishments.4
In a recent decision, Robinson v. California,5 the Supreme
Court took a new approach to the eighth amendment. The petitioner
was convicted under a California statute6 which makes it a mis-
demeanor, punishable by imprisonment, for any person to "be ad-
dicted to the use of narcotics." In sustaining the petitioner's con-
viction, the California court construed the statute as making the
"status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.' The California
' See ch. 14 of the Magna Carta, printed as confirmed by King Edward
I in 1297, 4 HALSBURY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND 24 (2d ed. 1948). "A free-
man shall not be amerced for a small fault; but after the manner of the
fault, and for a great fault, after the greatness thereof; saving to him his
contenement; and a merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; and
any other's villain than ours shall likewise be amerced, saving his wainage."
1 W. & M., c. 2, § I, 10. "Excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
'2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
610 (2d ed. 1851).
'The constitutions of 48 states have express prohibitions of excessive
punishment. Wording of the provisions varies from "cruel" to "cruel or
unusual" and "cruel and unusual," while constitutions of a few states only
provide that all punishments shall be proportioned to the offense. Connecti-
cut and Vermont have no constitutional prohibition against cruel punish-
ment, but Connecticut provides against excessive fines, CONN. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 13, and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20 (1958) makes cruel and unusual punish-
ment a crime. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 271 (1950) provides that the com-
mon law of England, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, applies.
See State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1933).
-370 U.S. 660 (1962).
' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721: "No person shall use, or be
under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when
administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the State
to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense
to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one
year in the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder
on probation for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in
which probation is granted require as a condition thereof that such person
be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the
court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from
the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county
jail."
7 People v. Robinson, Super. Ct. No. CR A-4425, App. Dep't Super. Ct.
of Los Angeles, March 31, 1961. The opinion was unreported, but may be
found in Record, p. 102, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Due
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court further held that the offender may be prosecuted even though
he has never used or possessed any narcotics within the state. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that narcotics
addiction is a sickness and that to make a sickness a crime is to
inflict a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
It has been.consistently held that the first eight amendments
restrict only the federal government and do not apply to the govern-
ments of the individual states.8 However, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment protects many rights from state infringe-
ment which are similarly- protected from federal encroachment by
the first eight amendments. - The test of whether any right is in-
cluded within the protection of the due process clause is whether
that right is "inherent in the fundamental principles of justice and
liberty which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." 10
In the Robinson case the Supreme Court for the first time definitely
stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment pro-
scribes cruel, and unusual punishment, although it had strongly indi-
cated such in an earlier case," and several lower courts had so
stated. 
2
- Mr. Justice McKenna's observation that "a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth,"'- has certainly been followed by the courts in applying the
cruel and unusual punishments provision. No longer is this prohibi-
tion limited to the physical brutality and torturous punishment con-
templated by its framers. A review of the cases which have dealt
with this clause will illustrate how the meaning of cruel and unusual
to California procedure, after affirmance by the appellate department of the
California superior court, no further review in the.state courts was available,
and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on direct appeal.
. 'E.g., Bartkus v. fllinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Collins v. Johnston, 237
U.S. .502 (1915); Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); McElvaine v.
Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
" E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), quoting from Herbert
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
"1Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
' Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 951-52 (S.D. Cal.
1950), revd on other grounds sub norn. Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d
308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951); Johnson v. Dye, 175
F.2d. 250, 256 (3rd Cir.), revd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864
(1949).
' Weems v, United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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punishment has been expanded as society's concepts of decency and
humanity have changed.
The first significant consideration of cruel and unusual punish-
ment by the Supreme Court was in an 1878 case from the Territory
of Utah. 4 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to be shot. A territorial statute provided that every
person guilty of murder should suffer death, but did not state the
mode of execution. Since the territory derived its authority from
the federal government, it was therefore subject to the limitations
of the eighth amendment. It was held that death by shooting was
not a cruel and unusual punishment, as it involved no terror 5 and was
regularly imposed under the Articles of War.'6 The Court stated
that even though it could not formulate an exact definition of cruel
and unusual punishment, it was axiomatic that torture and unneces-
sary cruelty were forbidden by the eighth amendment.
1
7
The next important decision was In re Kemmler,8 in which
the petitioner had been sentenced to death pursuant to a state statute
"by then and there causing to pass through the body of him . . .a
current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death."' 9  It
was contended that electrocution violated the eighth amendment
and the due process and privileges and immunities guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
repeating the principle that the first eight amendments restricted
only the federal government. However, the Court indicated that
electrocution would violate no constitutional right if used by the
federal government, stating that punishments are cruel "only when
they involve torture or lingering death."2  The eighth amendment
"implies ... something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life."'"
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
15 Such as the common-law punishments of dragging to the place of execu-
tion for treason, emboweling alive, beheading and quartering for high treason,
public dissection for murder, and burning alive for treason by a female. Id.
at 135.
1 The articles did not prescribe the method of inflicting death, but custom
had determined that capital punishment may be inflicted by shooting and
hanging. Id. at 133-34.
117Id. at 136.
'8 136 US. 436 (1890).
'9 Id. at 441.
20 Id. at 447.
21 Ibid.
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. I In a 1910 decision22 the defendant was convicted in a Philippine
court, which was under United States authority, of falsifying a public
document recording certain wage payments. He was sentenced to
fifteen years at hard labor in chains, a fine of four thousand pesatas,
loss of civil rights during imprisonment and political rights there-
after, and subjection to surveillance by the authorities for life. The
statute under which the sentence was imposed was declared void
and the conviction was reversed. The Supreme Court there estab-
lished the principle that punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual when it is not. graduated and proportional to the offense
committed. The Court's decision was largely influenced by the
result of its comparison of the defendant's sentence with penalties
imposed in other jurisdictions. It found that the defendant's punish-
ment not only greatly exceeded those which were usually inflicted
for similar offenses, but that more serious crimes such as robbery,
larceny, and some degrees of homicide were not punished so severely.
The Court also pointed out that other Philippine statutes did not
provide for such harsh punishment for much more atrocious crimes.
Other attacks on the severity of fines or terms of imprisonment
have generally failed. 3 Large aggregate sentences, arrived at by
treating a single act or series of acts as distinct offenses and im-
posing separate sentences for each, have been held not to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.24 The standard against which the
courts have measured the sentence or fine is not the total penalty, but
rather the penalty for each individual offense.25
Habitual criminal statutes under which repeated offenders are
punished more severely for the same offense than are persons with
shorter records have been upheld as not providing cruel and un-
usual punishment.20 Nor does it matter that the stricter sentence is
22 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
"E.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) ($1,623,500
in penalties -for violation of state anti-trust laws assessed against corpora-
tion with over forty million dollars in assets).2'Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (conviction on seven
counts of using the mails to defraud, concurrent five-year sentences and
$1000 fines on eich count); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462
'(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960) (conviction on fourteen
separate counts resulting from one sale of marihuana, two sales of heroin,
and possession of both, sentence of fifty-two years in jail).
"E.g., Manley v. Fisher, 63 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Scala v. United
States, 54 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1931).
" E.g., MacDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Beland v.
United States, 128 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942).
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imposed in a, special proceeding commenced by information after
conviction of a substantive offense.17
Shortening or remitting of a sentence is purely a matter of-
legislative or executive grace, so that none of the prisoner's constitu-
tional rights are infringed if he is denied these piivileges2 The-fed-
eral statute prohibiting probation of first-time narcotics -offenders2
does not violate the eighth amendment,30 nor does commutation of a
death sentence to life imprisonment without the opportunity of
parole."' In United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen32 the
petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 199
years in prison. Under Illinois parole law, a prisoner serving a life
term becomes eligible for parole after -twenty years, but a person
serving a term of years becomes eligible only after he has com-
pleted one third of his term. The petitiofier sought habeas corpus
claiming that his punishment was cruel and unusual because, as the
parole laws were framed, he would not live long enough to apply-
for parole. The writ was denied, even though the 199 year sentence
was a device specifically used to avoid the parole of murderers after
twenty years.
It has been held that a prison sentence does not become cruel
and unusual merely because the defendant is so old that he is
unlikely to survive it."3 Nor is a long sentence objectionable be-
cause equally guilty co-defendants have been dealt with more leni-
ently,34 or because the jurisdiction imposes lighter penalties on crimes
generally thought to be more grievous.35 Imprisonment at hard
labor is not objectionable." Solitary confinement for convicts con-
demned to death,3 7 and for a prisoner whose death sentence for
* Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).28E.g., Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958).
,' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7237(d).3o Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958).
81 Green v. Teets, 249 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957).
54 F. Supp. 973, (N.D. Ill. 1944), af'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
"E.g., Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 938 (1960) (30-year sentence for narcotics violations on a 51-year
old defendant).
, United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 794 (1946).
8 Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 135-36 (1903).
, 8Pervear ,y. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1866) (Court regarded piob-
lem as one of proportional sentence rather than of humaneness of punish-
ment).
"' McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891).
249-
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murder of a prison guard was commuted to life and who was con-
sidered dangerous as an inmate,38 were upheld against cruel and
unusual punishment objections.
I Electrocution came up again in 1946 in Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber."9 Willie Francis, having been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death by a Louisiana court, was placed in
the electric chair and subjected to an electrical current which was not
of sufficient intensity to cause his death, presumably because of some
mechanical defect. He was returned to prison and a, warrant for
his subsequent execution was issued. Francis contended that "two
electrocutions" would be a cruel and unusual punishment barred by
the eighth amendment. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court,
stated that the petitioner's claim would be considered "under the
assumption, but without so deciding, that violation of principles of
.. the Eighth Amendment.. . as to... cruel and unusual punish-
ment, would be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4 The Court expressly rejected the contention by the
petitioner that the manifold psychological factors involved in two
executions was cognizable under the eighth amendment. 4
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was based
upon the continued freedom of a state to administer criminal justice
unless it should offend "some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."42
Four members of the Court dissented,43 urging that the case
be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether current
was actually applied to the petitioner, and, if so, how much.4 4 They
88 Stroud v. Johnston, 139 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1943).
329 U.S. 459 (1947).
10 Id. at 462.
' "Even the fact that the petitioner has already been subjected to a current
of electricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the
constitutional sense than any other execution. The cruelty against which
the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed
to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident pre-
vented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add
an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to
inflict unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution." Id. at 464.
" Id. at 469, quoting Mr. Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
" Justices Burton, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. Id. at 472.
"There were conflicting affidavits in the briefs as to whether current had
[Vol. 41
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argued that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in-
corporates the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the
eighth amendment. If electric current had passed through Francis'
body during the first attempt, a second attempt would be a "cruel
and unusual punishment violative of due process of law," as this
would not be an instantaneous execution, which had been upheld by
the Court in the Kemmler45 case.
The 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles4" represents the second time
the Supreme Court has held a punishment to be cruel and unusual.
Trop had been convicted by a court martial of wartime desertion.
The Nationality Act of 1940 provided that a person so convicted
shall lose his citizenship.47 Trop brought action for a declaratory
judgment that he was an American citizen. The Supreme Court
declared the statute unconstitutional, four justices holding that. it
was penal in nature,4 s and that loss of citizenship as a punishment
reached Francis at all. These are set out in a footnote in the dissenting
opinion. Id. at 480-81 n.2.
"Then the electrocutioner turned on the switch and when he did Willie
Francis' lips puffed out and he groaned and jumped so that the chair came
off the floor. Apparently the switch was turned on twice and then the con-
demned man yelled: 'Take it off. Let me breath.'" Affidavit of official
witness Harold Resweber.
"I saw the electrocutioner turn on the switch and I saw his lips puff out
and swell, his body tensed and stretched. I heard the one in charge yell to
the man outside for more juice when he saw that Willie Francis was not
dying and the one outside yelled back he was giving him all he had. Then
Willie Francis cried out 'Take it off. Let me breath."' Affidavit of official
witness Ignace Doucet.
Attached to respondents' brief was a transcript of testimony, taken before
the Louisiana Pardon Board, of those who were in charge of the equipment
at the attempted execution that no electric current reached Francis' body
and that his flesh did not show electrical burns. Also included was a state-
ment by the sheriff of a neighboring parish that Francis told him on leaving
the chair that the electric current had "tickled him."
An interesting discussion of this case can be found in PRETTYMAN, DEATH
AND THE SUPREME COURT 90 (1961).
" it re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
"356 U.S. 86 (1958).
'766 Stat. 163, 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1958).
"The courts have held that deportation of an alien for the commission of
a crime involving moral turpitude is a civil proceeding so that the eighth
amendment does not apply. United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d
33 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955); Costanzo v. Tilling-
hast, 56 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 287 U.S. 341 (1932),
In United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellog, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929), it was
held that exclusion of an alien convicted of crime involving moral turpitude
before her marriage to a native-born American citizen did not inflict a cruel
and unusual punishment.
1963]
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for crime was cruel and unusual. 9 "There may be involved no
physical mistreatment, no primitive torture," the opinion remarks,
but "there is instead the total destruction of the individual's status
in organized society."50 The part of the decision that may have the
most far-reaching effects was the recognition that the mental as well
as the physical element must be considered in determining what
punishments are cruel and unusual."'
In the principal case the Court was not concerned with the
method of punishment or with a punishment disproportionate to
the offense as in previous cases. Rather, it was the purpose of the
confinement that was measured against the constitutional prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments. 52  "[Ilnmprisonment for ninety
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel
or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract.
Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for
the 'crime' of having a common cold."'  The Court recognizes the
authority of a state in the exercise of its police power to regulate
the administration, sale, prescription, and use of habit-forming
drugs," or to establish a program of involuntary confinement.5
While evidence of past narcotics use is necessary to prove addiction,
under the California statute involved in this case no proof of any
specific instance of use or possession within the jurisdiction was
necessary. The state only had to show that the defendant had the
"status" of addiction, for which he was to be punished.
4' Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker. Con-
curring, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that there was no relevant connection
between the act in question and any power granted to Congress by the
constitution.
In a companion case, the Court upheld another section of the Nationality
Act, which provided for automatic denationalization by voting in a foreign
election, as a valid exercise of congressional power to regulate foreign affairs.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
50356 U.S. at 101.
51 "It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress.
He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, and
when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated.
He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized
people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community
of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous conse-
quences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The
threat makes the punishment obnoxious." Id. at 102.
" Id. at 677 n. 5 (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).51 Id. at 667.
Id. at 664.
5 Id. at 665. California has established such a program. Cal. Welfare &
Inst'ns Code §§ 5350-361.
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The scope of the cruel and unusual punishments provision has
undergone considerable expansion since the eighth amendment was
adopted in 1791. The Weems5" decision extended its protection
to punishments disproportionate to the offense. Trop v. Dulles
57
recognized that mental anxiety must be considered. Now Robinson
v. California58 has put the legislatures on notice that the Court will
also apply the cruel and unusual punishments clause to the purpose
of a statutory penalty in deciding upon its constitutionality. This
case is an exception to the general rule that constitutional limita-
tions in the area of criminal law do not restrict the power of the states
to define crime, but only restrict the manner in which the states
may enforce their penal codes.
Whether the principle of the Robinson decision will be extended
to strike down other statutes which define offenses in terms of
personal condition must await future litigation.59 By applying the
cruel and unusual punishments provision to the states through the
fourteenth amendment and establishing limitations on the power
of states to define crime, the Supreme Court has significantly en-
larged its area of supervision of state penal legislation.
RALPH A. WHITE, JR.
Contracts-Employee Covenants Not to Compete-"Blue
Pencil" Rule
The case of Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender' marks the
first clear application of the "blue pencil" rule2 in employment con-
"' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
1356 U.S. 86 (1958).
8370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"In Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229, 236 (1900), the court
stated that conviction under a statute which provided that "all suspicious
persons" could be arrested and prosecuted as criminals, without anything
more, would impose a cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203
(1953); Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962).
'255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
Where a contract not to compete contains both lawful and unlawful
restrictions, if the restrictions are stated separably or in the alternative the
court will enforce the valid restrictions and disregard the invalid. In effect
the test is whether the court could take a "blue pencil" and mark out the in-
valid restrictions, leaving the valid ones to be enforced. E.g., Roane Inc. v.
Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; General Bronze Corp. v.
Schmiling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 518 (1932); 6A CoRaIN,' CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962); 5 WILLIsToN, CON-
TRACTS § 1659 (rev. ed. 1937).
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